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Introduction 
This work focuses on the disintegration of the world economy during the inter-war 
period and examines its effects on the Norwegian economic policies compared to 
other small European countries. Two very different patterns occur. In the 1920s 
several western European countries aimed their policy at restoring the pre-war 
economic regime. More precisely their goal was to re-establish a liberal economic 
order, wiz. free trade, fair competition and the gold standard at par value. This type of 
policy was pursued by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, 
Sweden and Norway. In the 1930s most countries responded to the international 
economic disintegration by an inward-looking focus aimed at protecting their own 
industries, labour market, and current account balance. A major feature was the 
monetary reactions. After Britain suspended gold redemption on September 20th/21st 
1931 several countries followed, dropping gold in favour of a floating currency. 
Protectionism, cartellisation and subsidies were other new instruments introduced in 
order to defend the domestic industries of most West European countries.  
 In 1920, Norway was a small open economy. In the following decade the 
Norwegian government, parliament and central bank fought to retain the pre-war 
system of a liberal economic order. In the 1930s this line was partly given up. Gold 
was suspended by the end of September 1931, and measures were taken to protect 
domestic industries, labour markets, and the current account balance. 
I the 1930s a regime of moderate protectionism was introduced. The new 
order resembled a return to the mercantilistic system that prevailed till the 1840s, a 
century earlier. The new protectionism included both qualitative and quantitative 
measures. Import tariffs were reintroduced or raised. Even the old mercantilistic 
element of import quotas was reborn. The reintroduction of protectionism had mainly 
two purposes. Firstly, as an answer to foreign protectionism, the government sought 
to defend its home markets for its domestic industries. In particular the authorities 
protected agr iculture and significant manufacturing industries, both facing severe 
competition from abroad. Secondly, the authorities sought to protect its exchange 
reserves. Despite this new orientation, one should bear in mind that Norway was still 
under a more liberal trade order than most countries in the Western world in the 
1930s. 
Cartellisation was also positively encouraged. It was an attempt to protect the 
supply side from over-production with its inevitable drop in prices and profits. A 
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negative consequence of this policy was the consumers´ loss, as prices were kept 
”artificially” high. In addition to cartellisation subsidies were introduced in order to 
support some industries, in particular agriculture.   
A semi-public campaign was also set on foot. The slogan was ”Buy 
Norwegian”. The aim was to stimulate the sale of Norwegian products in the domestic 
market and thus reduce the effect of economic slump among workers and producers. 
In opposition Labour had initially agitated for inflationary fiscal policies. 
However, after having gained governmental power in 1935, they abstained from 
pursuing budget deficit expansion. 
The deflationary monetary policy of the 1920s to restore, and after May 1928, 
to protect the pre-war gold parities, was given up in the early 1930s. Norway left gold, 
and a more successful inflationary monetary policy was conducted by the central 
bank. This change in monetary policy had two major effects. Domestic demand 
increased. Thus, production rose, and unemployment fell. Also, the depreciation of 
the krone made Norwegian industry more competitive against countries that still 
adhered to gold. Norwegian products became affordable abroad. They were also 
cheaper than foreign goods in the Norwegian domestic markets. Accordingly, a 
significant increase in both exports and imports substitution took place. Thus, a new 
monetary policy enabled Norway to recovery from the great depression quite rapidly.  
Most measures against the crisis were introduced around 1930. The bulk of 
these became permanent, later even extended. On this basis, the paper argues that the 
shift from a mainly liberal economic regime to a mixed regulatory regime started 
around 1930. This is contrary to the conventional view, which holds that the turn 
around started in 1935, when Labour came into office. 
 
Disintegration of the inter-war economy 
The inter-war economy can best be characterised by its fluctuations between crises 
and spurts of growth. The international economy saw two major crises. The first, the 
post-war depression, was in the early 1920s. The second, The Great Depression, was 
in the first half of the 1930s. Both were caracterised by steep falls in production and 
prices. The crisis of the 1930s was also accompanied by mass unemployement. In 
consequence of the collapse of the stock market on Wall Street from October 1929 
onwards, American banks experienced heavy losses. In consequence, American 
private banks could no longer offer short-term credits to Germany and Austria. Thus, 
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Germany and Austria could not meet their obligations. International liquidity shrunk 
rapidly. 
 On the international arena the national governments met the crisis of the 1930s 
by various protectionistic measures. The first measures were in fact tried out already 
in the 1920s, when in particular the USA and France, despite significant trade 
surpluses and under-valued currencies, decided to increase their tariffs. In the 1930s 
all Western powers to some extent adopted some kind of protectionism. International 
trade fell rapidly. 
 The lack of international liquidity, the collapse of the gold standard, the 
reintroduction of protectionism and the rapid drop in international trade represent the 
disintegration or de-globalisation of the 1930s. This trend was not reversed until the 
post-World War II period. The collapse of the world economy forced the governments 
to embrace protectionism. In turn, international trade fell even more. This process of 
disintegration and de-globalisation is reflected in the work of Hein Klemann, Olle 
Krantz and Ivan Jakubec. On the other hand, in Margrit Müller´s survey of the Swiss 
case, we note that Switzerland followed another course. In several areas they met the 
problems of the inter-war period by internationalisation of several industries. The 
Swiss case reminds us of the fact that there were significant differences in policy 
choice among European countries. 
 
The Norwegian inter-war economy 
In Norway the economy suffered three major setbacks during the twenty years 
between the world wars. The first, in the early 1920s, was due to the international 
post-war depression. However, it was amplified by the introduction of deflationary 
monetary policies aimed at restoring the pre-war gold parity of the Norwegian 
currency, the krone.1 This recession hit Norway harder than most other countries, and 
GDP per capita fell by 11.1 per cent 1920-1921.2 The fall in total production in the 
                                                 
1 Knutsen, Sverre and Gunnhild Ecklund, Vern mot kriser? Norsk finanstilsyn 
gjennom 100 år, Fagbokforlaget, Bergen 2000, pp. 121-131 argue that the emphasis 
on deflationary monetary policy in Norway in the early 1920s has been exaggerated. 
2 NOS XII. 163, National Accounts 1865-1960, Statistics Norway, Oslo 1968, table 
51, pp. 350-351. 
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United Kingdom and Sweden, our two most important trading partners at the time, 
was even bigger.3 
A new recession hit the Norwegian economy in the middle of the 1920s. This 
second slump is basically explained by the persistent deflationary policy, and 
reflected domestic rather than international problems. GDP did not fall significantly. 
However, investments did, and unemployment reached peak levels.4 Denmark, and to 
some extent Britain that pursued a similar stubborn monetary policy, also experienced 
a slump in the mid-1920s.5 The two major setbacks in the 1920s resulted in high 
unemployment during most of that decade. 
The third serious downturn came in the early 1930s, basically in consequence 
of the international depression. Norwegian GDP per capita fell by 8,4 per cent in 
1931.6 This huge decline, however, was partly due to a massive labour conflict with 
lockouts and strikes that year. According to studies carried out by Professor Jan Tore 
Klovland, the ”natural” trough during the depression can be dated to the last months 
of 1932, a few months later than most of Norway´s foremost trading partners.7 At the 
same time unemployment reached peak levels. In 1933 one third of the insured labour 
union members were laid off. The peak rate of unemployment across the entire labour 
force was around eleven per cent that year. During the worst winter months 1932-
1933 it probably touched 15 per cent.8 Also internationally unemployment met its 
peak level around 1933. This is noted by Anne-Lise Head König in her article on the 
labour markets during globalisation and disintegration 1880-1939 published in the 
present volume. 
In the remaining years of the inter-war period significant economic growth 
took place. This was partly due to the adjustment introduced in response to the 
                                                 
3 Maddison, Angus, Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992, OECD, Paris 1995, 
pp. 180-183 and 194-197. 
4 Grytten, Ola Honningdal, ”The Scale of Norwegian Interwar Unemployment in 
International Perspective”, Scandinavian Economic History Review, No. 2, 1995, pp. 
226-250. 
5 Maddison, Angus, op. cit., pp. 194-197. 
6 NOS XII. 163, op. cit., table 51, pp. 350-351. 
7 Klovland, Jan Tore, ”Monetary policy and business cycles in the interwar years: The 
Scandinavian experience”, European Review of Economic History, No. 2, 1998, pp. 
309-344. 
8 Grytten, Ola Honningdal and Camilla Brautaset, ”Family Households and 
Unemployment in Norway during Years of Crises. New Estimates”, The History of 
The Family, No. 1, 2000, pp. 36-37. 
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depressions. However, national accounts reveal that significant growth took place in 
the inter-war period as a whole. In Norway the annual rate of growth in GDP per 
capita was 2.2 per cent, 1919-1939.9 Prices fell almost constantly from the autumn of 
1920 to 1934, and were reduced by about 50 per cent according to the consumer price 
index. 10 Thus, the setbacks in the inter-war period certainly deserve to be titled 
depressions. 
 
Chart 1. GDP, exports and imports for Norway 1918-1939 (1918=100). 
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Source, NOS XII. 163, National Accounts 1865-1960, table 51, pp. 350-351. 
 
Following the disintegration of the international economy, the exports- and imports 
sectors suffered. Yet, despite years of serious setbacks, in terms of volumes the 
Norwegian export sector gained ground during the inter-war years. National account 
series for Norway report that annual growth in exports was 6.6 per cent in 1938-
                                                 
9 NOS XI. 143, National Accounts 1900-1929, Statistics Norway, Oslo 1953, table 14, 
pp. 128-129. 
10 Printout of Statistics Norway´s consumer price index (CPI) 1901-2000, Statistics 
Norway, Oslo 2001. 
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prices. The corresponding rate for imports was only 1.9 per cent.11 However, the 
value of the volume figures is limited. Terms of trade fell, since import prices rose 
compared to export prices. At the same time prices on international goods fell relative 
to domestic prices.  
Current figures offer a better picture of the importance of foreign trade in this 
matter.12 It is clear from chart 2 that both exports and imports lost ground. The 
disintegration of the international economy obviously had a negative effect on 
Norwegian foreign trade. 
 
Chart 2. Foreign trade in per cent of GDP for Norway 1915-1939. 
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Source, NOS XII. 163, National Accounts 1865-1960, table 50, pp. 346-347. 
 
The Norwegian policy response in the 1920s 
Like many Western governments, the Norwegian government responded to the crises 
in the 1920s by attempts to restore the institutional framework of the pre-World War I 
                                                 
11 NOS XII. 163, op. cit., table 51, p. 350-351. 
12 Ibid, table 50, pp. 346-347. 
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period, with a liberal trade order based on an international gold standard. The most 
visible action was the restoration of the old monetary system taken by several 
countries. For small, open economies, like the Norwegian, it was natural to follow the 
example of their most important trading partners. These were first and foremost the 
United Kingdom, and secondly Germany, and the neighbouring countries Sweden and 
Denmark.13 Norway followed the course taken by the United Kingdom, and so did 
Sweden and Denmark. With the exception of Finland, the Scandinavian countries 
pursued very similar economic policies both in the 1920s and in the 1930s, and, as we 
shall see, they were closely related to the British economic policy in the period. 
 Also Switzerland and the Netherlands chose to restore their pre-war gold 
parities. One aim was to regain confidence for their currencies and keep the financial 
markets open. This was particularly the case in Switzerland, as can be seen in Patrick 
Halbeisen´s article published in this volume. 
 
Monetary policy in the 1920s 
Inflationary monetary policy in the period 1914-1920 and limited access to imported 
goods 1914-1918 fuelled inflation and currency depreciation in Europe. Table 1 
reports inflation and currency depreciation in several Western countries 1914-1920. 
 In practice, the European countries followed three different paths in respect of 
monetary regimes and monetary policies in the 1920s. Most countries were unable to 
restore the pre-war parities. Some of these chose devaluation of their currencies, e.g. 
France, Italy, Belgium and Finland. Other countries chose to introduce new 
currencies, e.g. Germany, Poland, Austria, Hungary and the Soviet Union. The third 
alternative was to restore the old gold parities, as seen in the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway. Of these latter countries 
Denmark and Norway had the longest way to go. In the case of Norway, the krone 
had depreciated more than 50 per cent from August 1914 to November 1920.14 
 
 
                                                 
13 Schön, Lennart, En modern svensk ekonomisk historia: tillväxt och omvandling 
under två sekel, SNS, Stockholm 2000, Johansen, Hans Christian, The Danish 
Economy in the Twentieth Century, Croom Helm, London and Sydney 1987, pp. 12-
46 and Hodne, Fritz, The Norwegian Economy 1920-1980, Croom Helm and St. 
Martin´s, London, Canberra, and New York 1983, pp. 12-99. 
14 Bank of Norway, Annual Report 1924, Oslo 1925, p. 48. 
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Table 1. Inflation and exchange rates 1913-1920. 
  Consumer prices (1914=100) Whole-sale prices (1913=100) Exchange rate (Par=100) 
      
Germany 989 1485      5.5 
Finland 911  -    11.5 
Belgium  459  -    33.0 
France 341   509    31.1 
Italy 313   624    18.7 
Norway 302   377    49.9 
Sweden 270   347    71.5 
Denmark 262   374    50.0 
Switzerland 253  -    80.6 
United Kingdom  252   283    70.4 
Japan 223   268 101.9 
USA 206   243 100.0 
The Netherlands  210   281    75.1 
Canada 190   246    89.1 
        
Source, NOS, Statistical Yearbook for Norway 1921, pp. 281-284. 
 
To obtain this goal a deflationary policy was introduced. The first measures were 
taken by the central bank during the autumn of 1920. Granting of new credits was 
restricted and the central bank’s interest rates were increased. Arguably, the increase 
in interest rates was marginal, only one per cent. However, the measures were carried 
out at the same time as the international depression with rapid deflation hit the 
economy. Thus, real interest rates rose dramatically, from – 30 per cent pre-tax in 
1916 and 1917 to + 30 per cent in 1921, and almost + 40 per cent in 1922.15 
The post-war setback basically had three effects on the economy. In the first 
place, restricted credits and higher real interest rates caused a contraction in the 
money stock. This contraction was followed by reduced product demand, and thus, 
lower production, lower demand for labour and an increase in unemployment. 
Secondly, appreciation of the Norwegian krone from November 1920 through January 
1921, and from October 1921 through November 1922, raised the price of Norwegian 
products in international markets. Thus, cet. par. demand for Norwegian products fell, 
so did production, whereas unemployment increased. Thirdly, significant deflation in 
the early 1920s made credits more expensive. This happened in two ways: real 
interest rates increased, and the real value of debts increased. As a result, a number of 
firms went bankrupt, and the banking sector took heavy losses. Both in 1923 and in 
                                                 
15 Grytten, Ola Honningdal, ”Monetary Policy and Restructuring of the Norwegian 
Economy During Years of Crises, 1920-1939”, Myllyntaus, Timo (ed.), Economic 
Crises and Restructuring in History, Scripta Mercaturae, St. Katharinen 1998, p. 112. 
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1925 Norwegian bank losses amounted to seven per cent of domestic GDP. More than 
a hundred Norwegian banks, about half of the existing commercial banks, went into 
liquidation during the 1920s.16 
Economic crises, heavy bank- losses and mass unemployment forced the 
central bank to call a halt to the deflationary policy in 1923 and 1924. At that time the 
international post-war depression had also come to an end. Thus, the international 
business cycle pointed upwards. As a result of the pause in the deflationary monetary 
the krone depreciated from 70 to 50 per cent of its par value. A trade surplus was 
finally achieved in 1926. In turn, the krone started to appreciate in accordance with 
the trade surplus. The director of the Central Bank, Nicolai Rygg now grabbed the 
opportunity to resume a deflationary monetary policy. 17 In 1926 a governmental 
commission proposed a formal devaluation of the krone by 25 per cent to the gold 
value. The suggestion, however, was approved neither by the government nor by the 
central bank. The healthy foreign trade and the continuance of a deflationary 
monetary policy, made speculation in Norwegian money attractive. In a remarkably 
short time the krone rose to par.18 In October 1926 it reached 95 per cent of par value. 
Finally, on the first of May 1928 gold redemption at par value was restored.19 
A consequence of this second phase of deflationary policy was the onset of 
another slump. GDP however, only fell modestly. Investments and manufacturing 
output, dropped significantly, and unemployment reached peak levels.  
Prices fell dramatically during the times of deflationary policy. Wages, on the 
other hand were sticky and not brought down to the same degree. Thus, real wages, 
and in particular product wages, i.e. nominal wages deflated by production costs, 
increased dramatically. In manufacturing they were almost four times higher in 1932 
than in 1917. Labour intensive production became too costly, and declined. Capital-
                                                 
16 Knutsen, Sverre, Even Lange, and Helge W. Nordvik, Mellom næringsliv og 
politikk. Kredittkassen i vekst og kriser 1918-1998, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1998, 
pp. 11-42. 
17 Hanisch, Tore Jørgen, ”Om virkninger av paripolitikken”, Historisk tidsskrift, No. 
3,1979, pp. 244-247. 
18 Hanisch, Tore Jørgen, Espen Søilen, and Gunhild Ecklund, Norsk økonomisk 
politikk i det 20. århundre. Verdivalg i en åpen økonomi, Høyskoleforlaget, 
Kristiansand 1999, pp. 68-85. 
19 Bank of Norway, Annual Report 1927, Oslo 1928, p. 45 and Keilhau, Wilhelm, Den 
norske pengehistorie, Aschehoug, Oslo 1952, pp. 158-199. 
 11 
intensive production, however, increased in the 1920s.20 Thus, the policy of ”back to 
normal” in answer to the disintegration of the world economy resulted in mass 
unemployment. (Chart 3). 
 
Chart 3. Unemployment in per cent of labour force.  
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Source, Grytten, Ola Honningdal, An Empirical Analysis of the Norwegian Labour Market, table 9.1, pp. 177-178. 
 
International comparisons of the 1920s confirm that countries that pursued a 
deflationary policy were under-achievers in the fields of investments and production. 
They also had higher unemployment than those that adopted more inflationary 
policies.21 This view is corrobotated in Patrick Halbeisen´s article in this volume on 
monetary policy and international capital flows. 
                                                 
20 Grytten, Ola Honningdal, An Empirical Analysis of the Norwegian Labour Market, 
1918-1939: Norwegian Interwar Unemployment in International Perspective, 
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen 1994, pp. 239-
260.  
21 Eichengreen, Barry, ”Understanding 1921-1927: inflation and economic recovery 
in the 1920s”, Eichengreen, Barry (ed.), Elusive Stability. Essays in the History of 
International Finance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge NY 1990, pp. 24-56 
and Grytten, Ola Honningdal, ”Monetary Policy and Restructuring of the Norwegian 
Economy During Years of Crises, 1920-1939”, pp. 93-124. 
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Competition laws  
Another tool in the hands of the political authorities was the price, trust and cartel 
regulations. The new Price Act passed Parliament in 1920, the Unfair Competition Act 
in 1922, the Act Controlling Trade Practices in Restraint of Trade, commonly called 
the Trust Law, in 1926. When the ideas of these acts first were conceived the aim was 
to secure free competition and free market prices. The Trust Law was meant to be an 
anti-trust law. The act provided for a permanent trust control board, an executive 
director and a secretariat. Mr. Wilhelm Thagaard was appointed its first director. He 
held the position until 1960.22  
The political reactions to these laws differed significantly, and it was 
impossible to achieve a majority for any stand. Thus, the final law texts became quite 
general, and fell victims of their keepers´ interpretations. Thagaard took the view that 
market regulations were necessary to overcome the problem of over-production and 
falling prices. He argued that public price control boards might replace competition. 
When the price authorities found competition negative, firms could be forced into 
trustification. By 1928 the number of cartels in Norway exceeded 100. By 1960 they 
exceeded 500. 23 
 The political authorities also had other tools to protect markets from 
overproduction, falling prices and bankruptcy. In the 1920s steps were taken to 
regulate both fisheries and agriculture. The measures were taken partly by the 
organisations representing the two industries and partly by the government and 
Parliament. However, these steps lacked efficiency. One important reason for lack of 
success was the problem of dealing with free riders. Thus, policy tools needed to be 
improved. That was basically carried through in the 1930s. In addition to the 
measures introduced in the 1920s, new and more powerful market regulations were 
brought into play in the last decade before the Great War. 
  
The Norwegian policy response in the 1930s 
During the depression in the 1930s a serious breakdown in international relations took 
place. The monetary system failed, and the gold standard was in reality abandoned by 
almost every countriy by World War II. The rapid disintegration process is mirrored 
                                                 
22 Hanisch, Tore Jørgen et al, op. cit., pp. 118-124. 
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in the fact that international trade diminished in the early 1930s, and barely regained 
pre-World War I levels before World War II.24 (Chart 4).  
 
Chart 4. Imports of 75 countries January 1929-March 1933 in million US gold dollars. 
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Source, League of Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics , February 1934, p. 51. 
 
The break down of international trade in the 1930s is also analysed in Hein 
Klemann´s article in the present volume on international political development and 
international trade. The decade also saw a return to widespread protectionism, in the 
form of quantitative and qualitative measures aimed at reducing imports. To protect 
the interests of producers and employees, domestic and international cartels rapidly 
increased in number and size.25 Again, the small open economies followed the great 
                                                                                                                                            
23 Hodne, Fritz, op. cit., pp. 70-82. 
24 Kindleberger, Charles P., The World in Depression 1929-1939, Penguin Books, 
London 1987, p. 170 and League of Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, February 
1934, p. 51. 
25 Kindleberger, Charles P., ”Commercial policy between the wars”, Matias, Peter and 
Sidney Pollard (eds.), The Industrial Economies: The Development of Economic and 
Social Policies, The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol III, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1989, pp. 161-196. 
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powers. As for the Scandinavian countries, they followed Britain.26 However, due to 
their dependence on foreign markets, and fear of retaliation, the small and open 
economies practiced a cautious protectionism.27 
Writers on the history of Norwegian economic policy claim that a change of 
economic policy regime took place after the great depression of the 1930s. More 
precisely the shift is often dated from 1935 onwards, the same year as the Labour 
Party came to office.28 However, they admit, the shift was rather one of economic 
thought than one of actual policy. According to the conventional view a permanent 
shift in politics came after the war. This paper argues that a real change started during 
the depression years, more precisely around 1930. This shift did not in its original 
form represent a reorientation towards Keynesian fiscal policy, but a change towards 
government interference in the markets. The Keynesian revolution did not influence 
Norwegian economic policies until the post World War II era. And even at that stage 
classical Keynesian policy was not adopted, as the socialist government in Norway 
pursued a planning system more detailed than elsewhere, with direct interference in 
the market economy.29 In addition several bi- lateral trade and payment agreements 
were set up, were Norway took part in an active manner.30 
 
Protectionism 
As a small, open economy Norway did not profit from an international return to 
protectionism. To protect domestic industries and the exchange reserves, however, 
Norwegian customs tariffs were set up. In 1933 the average tariff on imported goods 
                                                 
26 Kitson, Michael and Solomos Solomou, Protectionism and economic revival: The 
British interwar economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990 and Cappie, 
Forrest, Depression and Protectionism: Britain between the Wars, Allen and Unwin, 
London 1983. 
27 Nordvik, Helge W., ”Europeisk handelspolitikk i historisk lys: Proteksjonisme og 
frihandel gjennom 200 år”, Norman, Victor D. (ed.), Europa - forskning om 
økonomisk integrasjon, SNF, Bergen 1995, pp. 37-40. 
28 Tore Jørgen Hanisch, Espen Søilen and Gunhild Ecklund argue that the period 
1930-1950 constitutes a transition period from liberal economic order to a planning 
economic order in Norway. Hanisch, Tore Jørgen et al., op. cit., pp. 91-94. 
29 Søilen, Espen, Fra frischianisme til keynesianisme? En studie av norsk økonomisk 
politikk i lys av økonomisk teori 1945-1980, Norwegian School of Economics and 
Business Administration, Bergen 1999. 
30 Hodne, Fritz og Ola Honningdal Grytten, Norsk økonomi i det 20. århundre, 
Fagbokforlaget, Bergen, pp. 166-168. 
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was 16 per cent, against ten per cent in 1929.31 Despite an increase of 60 per cent in 
three years, compared to other Western countries Norway together with the two other 
small Scandinavian states, Denmark and Sweden still maintained relatively low tariffs 
in the 1930s. (Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Custom tariffs in per cent of import values. 
  1929 1933/1934 1933/1934 in per cent of 1929 
       
Finland 19 33 174 
United Kingdom  12 30 250 
Spain 18 29 161 
Italy 11 26 236 
Germany   8 25 313 
USA 13 19 146 
Norway 10 16 160 
France   7 15 214 
Sweden   9 10 111 
Denmark   6   8 133 
        
Source, Anstrin, H., ”Handelspolitikens avvägar och Nordens utrikeshandel”, p. 21. 
 
The Norwegian tariffs fluctuated significantly for different kinds of goods. For 
traditional manufacturing goods they had been 18.3 per cent as early as 1930. They 
increased to 23.5 per cent in 1932 and to 24.8 per cent in 1937. For furniture, 
however, they were 7.8 per cent in 1930, 9.4 per cent in 1931, and were then reduced 
to 5.2 per cent in 1937.32 Despite this fact, modern Norwegian furniture industry was 
a success in the 1930s. 
 In addition to the increase in tariffs on several import goods, import quotas 
were set up for some products that could be replaced by domestically produced goods. 
However, these quotas were low, and it is not clear wether thay had any impact, since 
for several products the quotas were set higher than the actual imports. 
 
Cartellisation 
The inter-war cartellisation wave started already in the 1920s both nationally and 
internationally. The wave was clearly stimulated in the 1930s, notably in agriculture, 
                                                 
31 Anstrin, H., ”Handelspolitikens avvägar och Nordens utrikeshandel”, Industria, 
1937, p. 21. 
32 Lange, Even, Krise og vekst. Norsk treindustri i begynnelsen av 1930-årene, 
Universitetet of Oslo, Oslo 1974, p. 166. 
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industry, and international cartels. The major problem for agricultural products was a 
steep fall in prices due to over-production. 33 Since the demand for agricultural 
products were inelastic to changes in prices, a fall in prices tended to reduce the 
farmer´s income. In the 1920s farmers tried to solve the problems by forms of 
cooperation organised by themselves. However, due to the problem of free riders, the 
government and Parliamant had to intervene. In 1928 a state-owned monopoly for 
imports of corn was reorganised. The monopoly was to buy all domestically produced 
crops. In general an excess-price was paid to the producers, financed by selling 
imported corn at excess-prices to consumers.  
In the 1930s the government and the farmers associations recommended local 
boards be set up to regulate the sale and distribution of milk. The regulation was 
approved by law, as the so-called ”Sales Act” passed the national parliament in 1930. 
The act regulated first-hand sales of milk, egg, and bacon. The first milk board was 
set up the same year. From 1931 onwards, milk producers were to pay compulsory 
sales duties to these boards. This was deemed necessary to ensure equal production 
prices for milk.  
Cartellisation of the milk market did not alone solve the problems of excess 
supply of milk.34 In June 1931, the Parliament passed a law empowering the Ministry 
of Agriculture to order the addition of butter into all domestically sold margarine. 
Thus, the milk producers and their cartels received new markets for their products.35 
By the end of 1939 more than half of the milk produced for the national diary 
cooperation was used for the production of butter, and 64 per cent of that butter were 
added into margarine.36 This implies that about one third of the registered milk by 
decree was added into margarine. 
Other cartels and market regulation bodies for agriculture were organised. The 
regulation of the milk market served as a prototype for the regulation of the egg 
market, the meat market and the fruit and vegetable markets. Market regulation 
boards and co-ops were set up on a large scale. The farmers gained from the 
                                                 
33 Timoshenko, Vladimir P., World Agriculture and Depression, Ann Arbor 1933, pp. 
122-123. 
34 Skeie, J., Organisasjon og lovgivning til hjelp i jordbrukskrisen, Oslo 1933, pp. 17-
40. 
35 Hovland, Edgar, ”Smør og margarin blir ett fett”, Historisk tidsskrift, No. 3, 1979, 
pp. 305-325. 
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widespread regulations of the markets. On the other hand, the consumers lost through 
higher prices and reduced efficiency. 37 
As for fisheries, accounting for 25-30 per cent of the income from exports in 
inter-war Norway, a steep fall in the prices in the international markets demanded 
immediate and effective action. The first steps towards cartellisation were taken 
already in 1927, when the first-hand sales of herring were organised by the fishing 
industry itself. In December 1929 the government gave this cartel legal status. 
Henceforth all fresh herring for exports was to be handled by the cartel. In 1930 
Parliament confirmed this decree by making it a law, the so-called Herring Act. From 
June onwards, similar acts for exports of other species of fish, basically cod, passed 
Parliament. In 1938 the Raw Fish Act came into being, regulating all commercial 
first-hand sales of fish and fish products in Norway through cartels.38  
Norwegian industry also participated in international cartels, e.g. nitrates, 
steel, and oil tankers.39 The tanker pool may serve as an illustration of their operation. 
The International Tanker Owners Association Ltd, Intertanko, was organised in 
London in 1934. Counting for 95 per cent of the tonnage that competed in the free 
market for oil transports, the pool was in many ways a success for tank owners. 
Intertanko acted as a bargaining and hiring agency for oil tankers. The aim was to 
restrict the supply side of the market, in order to maintain rates that covered the ship-
owners´ costs of operating ships and covering the costs involved in laid-up tonnage.40 
 
Subsidies 
Maintaining producer prices and incomes for farmers was an important aim in most 
European countries. Besides protectionism and cartellisation, subsidies to producers 
were common. According to the historical national accounts Norwegian direct 
                                                                                                                                            
36 Mork, Rasmus, Melkeomsetning og meieridrift i Norge 1930-1940, Oslo 1941, p. 
247. 
37 Grytten, Ola Honningdal Grytten, ”The Consumers´ Burden. What did regulations 
of the Norwegian milk market in the 1930s cost consumers”, Basberg, Bjørn L., 
Helge W. Nordvik, and Gudmund Stang (eds.), I det lange løp, Fagbokforlaget, 
Bergen 1997, pp. 143-164. 
38 Hallenstvedt, A., Med lov og organisasjon, Oslo 1982, pp. 89-93 and Tande, 
Torvald, Norsk fiskeripolitikk, Oslo 1957, p. 195. 
39 Bergh, Trond, Tore Jørgen Hanisch, Even Lange,and Helge Pharo, Norge fra u-
land til i-land. Vekst og utviklingslinjer 1830-1980, Gyldendal, Oslo 1983, pp. 170-
175. 
40 Egeland, O. Kongeveien, Oslo 1968, vol II, pp. 300-308 
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subsidies increased from 28 million kroner in 1930 to 81 million in 1939, i.e. from 7.1 
to 11.5 per cent of the expenditures of the state. The increase took place from 1934 
onwards.41  
In addition, indirect subsidies were even higher. From 1927 indirect subsidies 
were given to crop producers through price guarantees. In the 1930s interest rates in 
state owned banks were subsidised, and farmers received government aid to switch 
their excess production from products with supply surplus to products facing demand 
surplus. Similar kinds of subsidies were extended to the fishing industry. Two state-
owned banks were established, in 1921 and in 1938, to give subsidised loans to the 
renewal of fishing tools and vessels. In 1936 a special state owned bank was 
established to support the expansion of manufacturing by granting low interest rate 
loans. The bank functioned as guarantor for manufacturing firms as well.  
 
“Buy Norwegian” 
A national organisation, Norwegian Work, was established in 1921. The purpose of 
the organisation was to promote import substitution. The organisation ran a series of 
slogans in the press, calling on consumers to buy Norwegian products to foreign ones, 
provided price and quality were equal. The Governor of the central bank, Nicolai 
Rygg, and the former Prime minister, Gunnar Knudsen, were both among the 
founders of this popular movement. However, as long as the economic and  political 
agenda was ”back to normal” and, thus, to restore ”normal” international economic 
relations, the organisation made little headway in the 1920s.  
From 1930 attitudes changed. In October 1931, some weeks after the 
suspension of gold, an appeal was published in all Norwegian newspapers. The 
appeal, under the slogan ”Buy Norwegian” was signed by the prime minister, 
members of the cabinet, the president of the parliament, the director of the central 
bank, the rector at the University of Oslo, representatives for both sides in the labour 
market, several other celebrities, and 25 nation-wide organisations and even churches. 
The message was called on consumers to buy Norwegian goods both to secure the 
balance of trade and domestic labour from being laid off. The same month the king 
and the entire royal family took up membership in Norwegian Work.  
                                                 
41 NOS XII. 163, op. cit., table 27A, pp. 196-203. 
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The “Buy Norwegian”-campaign continued, and its importance was often 
emphasised by the prime minister, other members of the government or other 
officials. In 1933 even the crown prince, in the first broadcasted speech by a member 
of the royal family, reminded the people of the importance of the campaign.  
According to national newspapers, the campaign was a success. Imports of 
substitutable manufactures, including furniture, textiles and clothing, fell significantly 
in the 1930s, while domestic production of those goods increased.42 However, as we 
will see in this work, monetary policy probably was a more important factor for 
import substitution in the Norwegian economy in the 1930s than this campaign. Some 
protests against the campaign came to the surface. In particular spokesmen for the 
export industries voiced critical remarks, since they feared ”retaliation” abroad. 
However, these protests failed to change the work of the organisation, but the 
sloagans were less stridently formulated in order not to provoke foreign exporters to 
Norway. 
 
Fiscal Policy 
It is often argued that 1935 marks the beginning of a paradigm shift in Norwegian 
economic policy and economic thought. That year the first general agreement 
regulating the labour market was negotiated, and Labour initiated its rule that was to 
last for two generations. A common view at the time was that the shift of power 
marked the recognition of the failure of capitalism. Henceforth unfettered markets 
should be replaced by a regime of planning.  
In my view there was no significant shift of paradigm in Norwegian economic 
policy in 1935. The Labour Party did not pursue an inflationary fiscal policy to 
stimulate demand in the 1930s. The public expenditures did increase, but so did taxes. 
The balance of the budget did not change in any direction. The late Professor Helge 
W. Nordvik examined the fiscal policy of inter-war Norway using an IS-LM model. 
He concluded that the fiscal policy was neutral in the 1930s. In the period of Labour 
government from 1935 until the German attack on Norway in April 1940, the average 
annual effect of the fiscal policy is calculated to have been virtually nil, or more 
precisely: + 0.1 per cent of the gross domestic product.43  
                                                 
42 Lange, Even, op. cit., pp. 145-164. 
43 Nordvik, Helge W., ”Finanspolitikken og den offentlige sektors rolle i norsk 
økonomi i mellomkrigstiden”, Historisk tidsskrift, No. 3, 1979, pp. 223-237. 
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Most changes that did take place in economic policy, in fact happened before 
1935, viz. changes in monetary regime, public subsidies, protectionism and 
cartellisation. One may argue that the first general agreement between the employers 
association and the trade unions in 1935 marked an important breakthrough for labour 
market planning. However, the first agreement only engaged 220.000 trade unionists, 
out of a total labour force of 1.3 million. The measures taken to regulate agriculture 
and fisheries earlier in the 1930s involved more people. According to the population 
census of December 1930 more than half a million people were engaged in the 
primary industries of the Norwegian economy at that time. In other words: agriculture 
and fisheries had already started the transformation process from free market 
industries to regulated industries when the first general agreement came to being. 44 
 
Monetary Policy 
At the time of Britain’s suspension of gold on September 20th-21st 1931, speculation 
against the Norwegian krone forced the central bank to take action. Interest rates were 
raised. The official discount rate on private banks´ borrowings from Bank of Norway 
was set up from four to five per cent on September 12th and then to six per cent on 
September 26th. On September 27th Bank of Norway suspended redemption at par 
value. The high point occurred September 28th when the bank rate was raised to eight 
per cent.45 This was deemed necessary to avoid large-scale capital outflow and to 
protect the krone from further speculation and possible depreciation.  
The bank board may have entertained an idea that it would be possible to 
restore gold when international currency markets had calmed down. However, it is 
clear that the decision to suspend gold was also made to benefit the export industries. 
The central bank feared they would lose competitive power, and since Britain was 
Norway’s largest trading partner, the central bank wanted the krone to closely follow 
the pound sterling.46 A tight monetary policy was pursued at first, and in September 
and October the krone depreciated against gold, but appreciated against sterling. 
However, the bank board feared the consequences of such a policy, and reduced the 
discount rate by two percentage points in October 1931.  
                                                 
44 NOS IX. 61, Population Census for Norway December 1st 1930, Vol. VIII, 
Statistics Norway, Oslo 1935, pp. 14-15. 
45 NOS C. 188, Historical Statistics 1994, Statistics Norway, Oslo 1994, table 24.22, 
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As a result, in November and December 1931 the krone depreciated slightly 
against sterling. The mid-December exchange rate of that year compared to the pre-
September 1931 values reveals that the krone had depreciated by 45.2 per cent against 
the US dollar, 31.2 per cent against gold, and 0.4 per cent against pound sterling.47 To 
protect its reserves, the Bank of Norway, the private banks and the business 
organisations voluntarily set up a currency committee to monitor and control the 
reserves through voluntary reporting.48 During 1932 and 1933 the krone stabilised at 
an exchange rate that implied ten per cent depreciation against sterling, while it 
fluctuated significantly against the US dollar and currencies tied to dollar or gold.  
The stabilisation of the krone against sterling along with a trade surplus from 
1932 onwards allowed for further reductions in the discount rate. On September 1st 
1932 it was back on the four per cent level, and was then cut to 3.5 per cent by the 
central bank in May 1933. 
The countries, which first suspended gold, feared devastating consequences. 
However, it soon turned out that abandoning gold had its advantages. In the first 
place, their currencies depreciated against those still clinging to gold. Thus, they 
gained competitive power as their products were cheaper in international markets. 
Hence, exports did not fall as much as in the gold countries. In addition, foreign 
produced goods were more expensive for Norwegian consumers. Thus, import 
substitution took place in those countries abandoning gold against those holding on to 
gold. Hence, depreciation countries often experienced trade surpluses. Again, the 
suspension of gold allowed for a more relaxed monetary policy. In fact, the money 
stock started to increase. In Norway the money supply (M1) in current terms was 
stable 1928-1933, having seen a steep fall in the 1920s. It started to grow at the end of 
1934. In real terms the turning point was in 1932, after the suspension of gold in 
September 1931.49  
An increase in the money supply caused a positive shift in demand, resulting 
in higher production and lower unemployment. Deflation was replaced by moderate 
inflation. Nominal interest rates decreased as well, and this gave a boost to 
investments. In 1931 real interest rates before taxes reached almost 20 per cent in 
                                                                                                                                            
46 Bank of Norway, Annual Report 1931, Oslo 1932, p. 42. 
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48 Hodne, Fritz, God Handel, Norges Handelstands Forbund, Oslo 1989, pp. 189-194. 
49 This is the over-all trend when looking at M0, M1, and M3. 
 22 
Norway. In 1937 they were close to minus ten per cent.50 In the years 1931-1939 
investment and export volumes grew by 60 and 52 per cent respectively. GDP by 
volume showed a growth of 39 per cent in the same period.51  
Since those countries, which left gold early, in general experienced milder 
depressions and more rapid recoveries than the gold countries, both their central 
banks and their governments lost interest in restoring par values for their currencies. 
In 1933 the Sterling Area was established. Its members were countries that aligned 
their currencies to pound sterling, includeding most of the Commonwealth and the 
British colonies, several Middle Eastern countries, Portugal, and the Scandinavian 
countries. From July onwards, the Norwegian krone was tied to pound sterling at a 
value of 19.90 against 18.16 under the gold standard, a devaluation of ten per cent to 
the pound. In reality gold was not only suspended, but also abandoned. The new 
currency regime was in fact a Sterling standard. Econometric tests confirm that the 
member states of the Sterling Area were among the best economic performers in the 
1930s with regards to gross national product, investments, exports, employment, and 
import substitution. In Europe the Gold Bloc countries were the losers.52  
Table 5 offers the estimated correlation between currency depreciation and 
key variables, including GDP, investments, export, export surplus and unemployment 
for 15 Western national economies. The estimated regressions coefficients are 
calculated as simple regressions, in which currency depreciation is the decisive 
variable and the key economic macro indicators are the response variables. The data 
are based on per centage changes 1929-1935, with 1929 as 100. (Here currency 
depreciation gives values lower than one hundred). All key macro indicators are in 
real terms except for export surpluses, which are in nominal figures. The 15 countries 
included in the calculations are eight small economies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, and seven large 
economies: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. Regressions are run on data of all the 15 countries, the 13 European 
countries and the eight small European Countries. The results are reported in table 3. 
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51 NOS XII. 163, op. cit., table 51, pp. 350-351. 
 23 
Table 3. Regressions. Influence of monetary policy on macroeconomic indicators. 
  N ß1 T R2 
  15 -0.365 -3.159 0.434 
 GDP per capita (E) 13 -0.342 -3.580 0.538 
    8 -0.476 -3.291 0.638 
  15 -1.692 -5.919 0.729 
 Gross Investments (I) 13 -1.667 -8.291 0.862 
    8 -1.223 -8.894 0.929 
  15 -1.022 -5.219 0.677 
 Exports (X) 13 -1.011 -5.333 0.721 
    8 -0.801 -3.003 0.601 
  15 -0.953 -9.393 0.872 
 Export surplus (X-M) 13 -0.945 -9.304 0.887 
    8 -0.889 -4.800 0.793 
  15  6.374  3.936 0.544 
 Unemployment (U) 13  6.316  4.042 0.598 
    8  9.914 10.562 0.949 
N=15: All 15 countries in the sample. 
N=13: All European countries in the sample 
N=8: The eight small European countries in the sample. 
 
The table confirms that there was a significant positive correlation between currency 
depreciation and economic growth, investments, exports and export surplus, and a 
negative correlation between currency depreciation and the scale of unemployment. 
More precisely the estimated slopes of the regression lines between growth in GDP, 
investments exports and export surplus on the one hand, and the developments of the 
currency values on the other hand, are negative. There is a positive slope of the 
regression line between currency values and unemployment. 
 On the basis of these test for 15 countries we may conclude that monetary 
policy was a decisive factor for the economic development in the 1930s. Those 
countries that left gold had a milder recession and a more rapid recovery than those 
that remained on gold.  
Apart from monetary policy, economic policies differed significantly between 
countries within the same monetary regime. However, the pattern of economic 
development followed that of monetary policy. This indicates that monetary policy 
may have been one of the most decisive policy factors for economic performance in 
the 1930s. 
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Conclusions  
The present paper examines the Norwegian policy response to the disintegration of 
the inter-war economy. In the 1920s efforts aimed at protecting the liberal trade order 
and the pre-war monetary system, with the Norwegian currency, the krone, linked to 
gold parity established in 1874. However, towards the end of the decade the first steps 
were taken towards public support for cartellisation. 
In the 1930s the answer to international disintegration was quite another. 
Norway abandoned gold, and ran a more relaxed monetary policy. Voluntary currency 
controls were introduced to avoid large-scale capital outflow. Countrywide cartels 
were established, in particular in agriculture and fisheries. These sectors were also 
subsidised to protect them from the negative consequences of over-production and the 
break down of the world economy. Protectionism was reintroduced, especially to 
protect manufacturing industries. 
Quantitative comparisons based on key macro variables confirm the view that 
monetary policy played a central role for economic performance in small, open 
economies. Sticking to gold had negative effects. Conversely, abandoning the fixed 
exchange rate system and and pursuing a more inflationary monetary policy had a 
positive inpact on economic performance. The lesson is that a flexible monetary 
response was the superior strategy in the circumstances. 
Several writers on Norwegian economic history have often claimed that a 
change in economic policy regime, from a free market philosophy to an active state 
philosophy, occured in 1935 when the Labour Party came into office. Admittedly, 
most changes were introduced after 1945. However, this article argues that significant 
changes in economic policy started earlier, around 1930.  
 
 
